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ExECuTivE SuMMARy
by Jan A. deRoos, Crocker H. Liu, and Andrey D. Ukhov
L
enders’ evaluation of the hotel industry’s prospects can be assessed using a metric called the 
relative risk premium, which we introduce in this report. Similar to the canary in a coal mine, 
changes in the relative rates that lenders charge for hotel loans, as compared to those for office 
buildings, give an early warning of relative hotel loan delinquencies. This metric is based on 
the practice of lenders charging higher interest rates for hotel loans than on office buildings. The relative 
risk premium measure is defined as the interest rate on hotels minus interest rate on office buildings. 
Changes in this measure predict relative hotel loan delinquencies (delinquencies on hotel loans minus 
delinquencies on office building loans). Office loans are an appropriate benchmark to measure the 
relative health of hotel loans because office building occupancy has a relationship with the economy 
and with room-night demand. Spreads on hotel loans widen when lenders anticipate higher hotel 
delinquencies relative to offices and narrow during periods when relative delinquencies for hotels are 
expected to drop. We also find three other bellwethers for hotel delinquencies: an increase in the 
volatility of hotel REIT returns (risk), a negative shock to expected earnings forecasts (which signals 
lower expected future profitability), or an increase in unemployment. Interestingly, the converse 
situation doesn’t hold, and an increase in relative delinquencies is not useful in predicting a rise in the 
relative risk premium.
Keywords: risk premium, pricing of risk, delinquencies forecasting.
Relative Risk Premium: 
A New “Canary” for 
Hotel Mortgage-Market Distress
Cornell Hospitality Report • November 2014 • www.chr.cornell.edu   5
Jan A. deRoos, Ph.D., is the HVS Professor of Hotel Finance and Real Estate and an associate professor at the Cornell University School 
of Hotel Administration (jad10@cornell.edu). On the faculty of the Hotel School since 1988, he has devoted his 
career to hospitality real estate; with a focus on the valuation, financing, development, and operation of lodging, 
timeshare, and restaurant assets. He is founding director of the Center for Real Estate Finance and founded the 
undergraduate Minor in Real Estate at Cornell University. He teaches courses in the SHA undergraduate and 
graduate degree programs, teaches extensively in the Executive Education programs, and has developed an on-line 
professional Certificate in Hotel Real Estate Investments and Asset Management. His most recent work includes 
publications in the Journal of Real Estate Research, the fourth edition of The Negotiation and Administration of 
Hotel Management Contracts, co-authored with James Eyster, the third edition of the Hotel Valuation Software, co-
authored with Stephen Rushmore, and chapters in the most recent editions of Hotel Asset Management: Principles 
and Practices and Hotel Investments: Issues and Perspectives, both published by the American and Hotel Lodging Association.
Crocker H. Liu, Ph.D., is a professor of real estate at the School of Hotel Administration at Cornell where he holds the Robert A. Beck 
Professor of Hospitality Financial Management (chl62@cornell.edu). He previously taught at New York University’s Stern School of Business 
(1988-2006) and at Arizona State University’s W.P. Carey School of Business (2006-2009) where he held the McCord Chair. His research 
interests are focused on issues in real estate finance, particularly topics related to agency, corporate governance, organizational forms, 
market efficiency and valuation. Liu’s research has been published in the Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal 
of Business, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Financial 
Markets, Journal of Corporate Finance, Review of Finance, Real Estate Economics, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, Journal of Real Estate Research and the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. He is currently 
the co-editor of Real Estate Economics, the leading real estate academic journal and is on the editorial board of 
the Journal of Property Research. He also previously served on the editorial boards of the Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics and the Journal of Real Estate Finance. Liu earned his BBA in real estate and finance from 
the University of Hawaii, an M.S. in real estate from Wisconsin under Dr. James Graaskamp, and a Ph.D. in finance 
and real estate from the University of Texas under Dr. Vijay Bawa.
Andrey D. ukhov, Ph.D.,  is an assistant professor of finance in the School of Hotel Administration (au53@
cornell.edu). Professor Ukhov is an expert on a wide range of investments, including preferred stocks, warrants, derivative securities, and 
convertibles. His research papers have been published in Management Science, the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, the Review 
of Finance, Quantitative Finance, the Economic History Review, the Journal of Real Estate Research, and other 
academic journals. Professor Ukhov is a frequent presenter and discussant at international finance conferences. 
Prior to joining the School of Hotel Administration, he taught both undergraduate and graduate finance courses 
at Kelley School of Business; Indiana University; and Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. He 
has received numerous teaching awards at Cornell, Indiana, and Northwestern for undergraduate-, master’s-, and 
PhD-level courses. Prior to becoming an economist, Professor Ukhov studied applied mathematics, mathematical 
physics, and computer science. He received two US patents for technology inventions. Professor Ukhov earned 
a bachelor’s degree in economics with distinction, and an MA, MPhil, and PhD in financial economics, from Yale 
University.
 
Acknowledgments: We wish to thank Jack Pong of Trepp for data on the monthly delinquency rates for office and hotel properties, Peng 
(Peter) Liu for the spread at time of origination data, Jack Corgel and participants of  the  American  Real  Estate  and  Urban  Economics  
Association  (AREUEA)  48th  Annual Conference in San Diego for helpful discussions. We thank an anonymous reviewer and Michael McCall  
(the Editor) for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the report.
ABouT THE AuTHoRS
Wally Boudry
Assistant Professor of Real 
Estate
PhD, New York University
John (Jack) Corgel
Baker Professor of Real 
Estate
PhD, University of Georgia
Jan deRoos
HVS Professor of Hotel Finance 
and Real Estate
PhD, Cornell University
 CREF Faculty
Peng(Peter) Liu
Assistant Professor Real Estate
PhD, University of California, 
Berkley
Crocker H. Liu
Robert A. Be k Prof ssor of Hospitality 
Financial Management 
PhD, University of Texas
Daniel C. Quan
STB Distinguished Professor in 
Asian Hospitality Management 
PhD, University of California, 
Berkley
 CREF Faculty
6 The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University
CoRnELL HoSpiTALiTy REpoRT
T
his report introduces a new metric for hotel distress, the relative risk premium. Defined as the 
interest rate on hotels minus the interest rate on office buildings, the risk premium predicts 
relative hotel loan delinquencies (that is, delinquencies on hotel loans minus delinquencies on 
office building loans). The level of relative risk premium accounts for general variation in interest 
rate levels and focuses on the relative cost of funds for hotels. Similarly, working with relative 
delinquencies accounts for the variation in the degree of general distress in commercial real estate 
loans.
by Jan A. deRoos, Crocker H. Liu, and Andrey D. Ukhov
A New “Canary” for Hotel Mortgage-Market Distress
Relative Risk Premium: 
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As we explain in this report, the widening or tightening 
of the incremental hotel risk premium contains valuable in-
formation for forecasting hotel loan delinquencies. Spreads 
on hotel loans widen when lenders anticipate higher hotel 
delinquencies relative to offices and narrow during periods 
when relative delinquencies are expected to drop. We also 
find that the following act as bellwethers for hotel delinquen-
cies: an increase in the volatility of hotel REIT returns (risk), 
a negative shock to expected earnings forecasts (signaling 
lower expected future profitability), or an increase in unem-
ployment. Exhibit 1 shows how effective our “canary metric” 
is in forecasting hotel delinquencies. We must note, however, 
that the converse situation doesn’t hold, so that an increase 
in relative delinquencies is not useful in predicting a rise in 
the relative risk premium.
The Relationship of Hotels and Office Buildings
The reason we selected office properties as a comparison for 
hotels is that office space has an economic link with hotel 
demand. One might expect that retail (rather than office 
buildings) would seem to be a logical comparison to hotels, 
since retail uses percentage leases that give landlords a call 
option on the economy in good times and a base rent in bad 
times.1 Instead, several professional hotel advisory services, 
such as Cushman & Wakefield  and HVS, have found that a 
historical relationship exists between occupied office space 
and room-night demand.2 This relationship exists in part be-
cause corporate travelers are one of the three major sources 
of hotel demand.3 Another reason for choosing office prop-
erty as a benchmark for comparison to hotels is the differ-
ence in lease characteristics. Office properties have lengthy, 
multi-year leases, in contrast to the 24-hour lease typical 
1 A percentage lease is a lease whose rental is based on a percentage of the 
monthly or annual gross sales made on the premises. Common types of 
percentage leases include a fixed minimum rent plus a percentage of the 
gross, a fixed minimum rent against a percentage of the gross, whichever 
is greater; and a fixed minimum rent plus a percentage of the gross, with a 
ceiling to the percentage rental among others.
2 For example, Cushman and Wakefield found that for Washington, D.C. 
approximately 263 room nights are generated per year on average for 
every 1,000 square feet of occupied office space per year (Cushman and 
Wakefield, “More Than a Guessing Game: Number Crunching and Market 
Comparisons Shed Light on Hotel Demand,” http://valuation.cushwake.
com/Valuation/documents/publications/BB_Hotel_Demand_CM_V_Au-
g08EN.pdf).
  
3 David Fuller and Caitlin McKenna, “The HVS Employment‐Hotel 
Growth Index: A new tool for projecting hotel room night demand,” HVS 
Consulting and Valuation Services (March 2009).
Exhibit 1
Relative delinquency rates: actual and model 
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increases their risk profile as compared to all other major 
property types that have longer term leases. 
For these reasons, it makes sense to use a relative risk 
premium that compares hotels to other real estate, rather 
than an absolute risk premium, which would involve a 
comparison to U.S. Treasuries (viewed as having zero risk). 
The difference between the mortgage interest rate on a 
given property type and the risk-free rate is called the risk 
premium. The risk premium represents the return over 
and above the risk-free rate that the lender (or investor) re-
quires as compensation for bearing the risk represented by 
the loan. We use a relative risk premium, which is the dif-
ference between the interest rate on hotels and the interest 
rate on office buildings. This is equivalent to the difference 
in the risk premiums on hotels and office buildings. As is 
the case with the risk premium over Treasuries, the relative 
risk premium is the lender’s or investor’s compensation for 
bearing added risk for lending on a riskier asset, relative 
to a less risky asset. We offer a detailed explanation and an 
example of the relative risk premium in Appendix A. 
Exhibit 2 provides an illustration of the relative risk 
premium, by depicting the incremental interest rate com-
ponents for hotels relative to offices and to the yield on a 
10-year constant maturity Treasury bond. The area in blue 
for hotels. Needless to say, the future cash flows from hotels’ 
short-term “leases” entail greater uncertainty than long-term 
office leases. This is the reason that lenders generally require 
a greater risk premium for hotels. The short-term lease con-
tract makes hotels more prone to shocks arising from capital 
market changes, the general economy, and event risk. Unlike 
office buildings, which are insulated from some of the risk of 
economic events by their five- to ten-year leases, hotels have a 
greater sensitivity to changes in the economy, which increases 
the loan pricing of risk in the form of higher interest rates 
than office buildings.
Analyzing the Relative (Differential) Risk 
Premium
The nature of the hotel industry is an underlying factor in 
lenders’ practice of charging a higher interest rate for hotel 
loans. They suggest that underwriting hotel property is riskier 
relative to loans on other property types because hotel loans 
represent both a business loan and a real estate loan. Lend-
ers find it difficult to disentangle the hotel business from the 
underlying real estate. Loans on all other property types, in 
contrast, are mortgages on the real estate but not also a loan 
on the business that occupies the property. The fact that 
hotel rooms are essentially marked to market on a daily basis 
Exhibit 2
incremental interest-rate components for hotels
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represents the nominal interest rate on 10-year constant ma-
turity Treasury bond, which includes the real rate of interest 
and the inflation premium.4 The area in red denotes the risk 
premium for office properties, which is driven by implicit 
default risk and the systematic factors that drive all real es-
tate property types, including the general real estate market 
risk premium, compensation for the general illiquidity of the 
commercial real estate market, transaction costs, tax treat-
ment, and other imperfections in the commercial real estate 
market. In sum, the area in red can be thought of as the risk 
adjustment that is systematic in nature and is shared by all 
property types, plus the idiosyncratic risk associated with 
offices. The yellow section represents the difference between 
hotel and office interest rates. This is the risk premium dif-
ferential, which captures the risk of hotels relative to office 
properties. Exhibit 3 displays a plot of the risk premium 
differential plotted with the difference in standard deviations 
of hotel and office returns. The positive standard deviation 
4 Longer-maturity credit instruments such as 10-year treasuries are prob-
ably better at reflecting anticipated future economic conditions one to two 
years ahead. See: Simon Gilchrist, Vladimir Yankov, and Egon Zakrajšek, 
“Credit Market Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Corpo-
rate bond and Stock Markets,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 56, No. 
4 (May 2009), pp. 471–493.
difference is another indication that hotels have higher risk 
than office properties.
In summary, by looking at the interest rate differential 
between hotel and office property types, we already control 
for factors that systematically affect all property types, in-
cluding the capital market and general economic conditions, 
regardless of whether they are observable.5 Consequently, 
we are better able to study traits that elicit a differential risk 
premium between property types.
The primary objective of this report is to determine 
whether the relative risk premium contains useful informa-
5 We also estimate a VAR model (not reported for brevity), which focuses 
on the relationship between financial variables in the office and hotel loan 
markets. The results support using office building loan market as a bench-
mark. The main findings are: (1) Rising interest rates (rates on a 10-year 
Treasury) result in rising loan rates for offices and hotels; (2) By itself, the 
risk- free rate (the rate on a 10-year Treasury) does not forecast delin-
quency rates for either offices or hotels. This result is as expected, when 
the information on loan performance is contained in the risk-adjusted 
rates, such as the spread; (3) Changes in interest rates on office loans have 
a strong and persistent effect on hotel loan rates, but the effect of shocks 
in hotel loan rates on office loan rates is much weaker in magnitude and 
less persistent; and (4) An increase in the level of delinquencies in office 
loans forecasts an increase in delinquencies in hotel loans. These results 
taken together point to the leading nature of office loan market, providing 
another justification for using office building loans as a benchmark.
Exhibit 3
Difference in standard deviations of hotel and office returns
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tion to predict future hotel loan performance.6 Research has 
emphasized the information content of corporate spreads as 
indicators of default risk and also future economic activity. It 
has been shown theoretically that as credit spreads rise, the 
supply of funds starts to contract. As a consequence, asset 
prices fall and the likelihood of default increases as firm 
equity narrows.7 Despite that analytical frame, the pricing 
of risk in real estate markets has received relatively little em-
pirical attention. To fill that void, we study the pricing in a 
market with short-term leases relative to pricing in a market 
with long-term leases. To allow for the mutual impact of 
inter-dependent economic time series, we use a vector auto-
regression (VAR) framework. We also examine whether 
lenders set hotel interest rates based on expected credit risk.8 
Our study spans a variety of economic conditions including 
expansions and contractions.9
Data and Methodology
Our variables are intended to capture the state of the 
economy and the capital markets. The variables include 
expected earnings per share and the unemployment rate or 
the growth rate in employment, which are all metrics that 
influence either discretionary income or people’s percep-
6 Studies on credit spreads have focused on one of three issues: (1) the 
relation between the risk free rate or its term structure and the credit 
spread, (2) the credit spread puzzle arising from the fact that the default 
risk isn’t as variable as the credit spread over time, and (3) whether asset 
prices correctly reflect and in turn are affected by fundamental economic 
factors. In this study we focus on issue 3. For a recent discussion of the 
importance of understanding real estate debt performance and delinquen-
cies see: Deniz Igan and Marcelo Pinheiro, “Exposure to Real Estate in 
Bank Portfolios,” Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), pp. 
47–74.
7 Thomas Philippon, “The Bond Market’s Q,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 124, No. 3 (2009), pp. 1011–1056.
8 For example, Morgan and Ashcraft find that interest rate spreads on 
loans are good predictors of future loan performance and rating down-
grades for banks. Thus, interest rate spreads are good forward-looking 
measures of risk. The authors propose that regulators should consider bas-
ing capital requirements on loan interest. See: Donald Morgan and Adam 
Ashcraft, “Using Loan Rates to Measure and Regulate Bank Risk: Findings 
and an Immodest Proposal,” Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 24, 
No. 2/3 (2003), pp. 181–200.
9 This is important because the longer economic history adds statistical 
power to the analysis in lieu of a shorter time period and more frequent 
sampling. If two time series make relatively slow movements through 
time (a common feature for economic data) then a long time series 
(spanning many years) is needed before the true joint tendencies f the two 
variables can be measured reliably. Obtaining many observations by sam-
pling frequently (say, through weekly or even daily observations) does not 
appreciably increase the power to measure the joint relationship between 
the two time series if the data span a total of only a few years. Robert J. 
Shiller and Pierre Perron, “Testing the Random Walk Hypothesis: Power 
vs. Frequency of Observation,” Economic Letters, Vol. 18, (1985), pp. 381-
386. Also, Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1989).
variable Description and Source of Data
Delinquency 
rate (DELinQ)
Percentage of loans 30+ days delinquent or in 
foreclosure for hotels minus the percentage of 
loans 30+ days delinquent or in foreclosure 
for offices. Source: Trepp
Difference in 
Standard 
Deviation 
(DiFFSTDEv)
The percentage difference in the standard 
deviation of total returns on hotel REITs (real 
estate investment trusts) and office REITs. To 
calculate the standard deviation for each 
property type a rolling twelve month window 
is used on the total return series for a given 
REIT property type using daily returns data. 
DIFFSTDEV = σHotel – σOffice. Source: National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Risk premium 
Differential 
(RiSKDiFF)
The percentage difference in the spread at 
time of origination between hotel loans and 
office building loans; interpreted as the 
additional risk premium associated with hotel. 
Source: Lehman Brothers and Cushman & 
Wakefield  
(http://www2.cushwake.com/sonngold/) 
percent Change 
(Growth Rate) 
in Total 
Employment 
(EMpL)
The change in the number of employed 
persons from period to period expressed as a 
decimal. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS)  
(via http://www.economy.com/freelunch)
percent Change 
in Forward 
Earnings per 
Share (pCTEpS)
PctEPS = {(EEPSt/EEPSt-1) – 1} * 100. EEPS is 
Forward Earnings per Share, analysts 
estimates of earnings per share for the 
S&P500. This measure is the change in 
anticipated profits (expressed as a percent) in 
contrast to the change in  actual corporate 
profits. Source: http://www.yardeni.com
unemployment 
rate (unEMpL)
Number of unemployed persons divided by 
the labor force, where the labor force is the 
number of unemployed persons plus the 
number of employed persons; expressed as a 
percent. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS)  
(via http://www.economy.com/freelunch) 
Exhibit 4
Descriptions and sources of variables
tion of financial security. Exhibit 4 gives a description and 
sources of all variables.
The risk premium differential variable is based on the 
average spread for a property type over Treasuries at the 
time of loan origination (SATO) for mortgage loans for 
hotels and office property types. Monthly SATO for hotels 
and office buildings is obtained from Lehman Brothers for 
the period of July 1998 through January 2008. We update 
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the SATO data using the Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-
Goldman survey of indicated monthly spreads for conven-
tional commercial mortgage loans over a 10-year Treasury 
bond, beginning in February 2008 and ending in March 
2011.10 These data give us a relatively long time series that 
encompasses both times of economic growth and recessions, 
allowing us to study the informational content of the spread 
under a variety of economic conditions. The Lehman data 
are normalized for loan size and loan-to-value ratio (LTV) 
to capture the true difference in SATO by property type, 
while the Cushman data are normalized for loan size but not 
LTV.11 We used the Cushman data because the Lehman data 
series ended with the firm’s collapse in 2008.12
Results
We find that the relative risk premium reflects information 
on expected relative delinquencies between hotels and office 
buildings. The interest rate spread in Exhibit 2 (the shaded 
yellow band) and Exhibit 3 (the heavy solid line) provide 
evidence of the substantial time series variation in the 
incremental risk premium for hotels over and above office 
properties. There is only a brief period in 2008 when lenders 
did not require additional compensation for originating ho-
tel loans compared to office properties. In all other periods, 
lenders required a higher return on the money that they 
lent on hotels relative to office buildings. This was especially 
the case during the financial crisis. Thus, borrowing cost is 
linked to future loan performance for the two property types.
10 According to Christopher T. Moyer at Cushman & Wakefield, the rate 
ranges are based on general rate indications from lenders for those asset 
classes, recent quotes, and closed transactions.
11 Studies  have  also  used  SATO  data  that  hasn’t  been  normalized. 
For  example,  the  ACLI data  on  loan commitments made by life insur-
ers that Nothaft and Freund use in their study are also not standardized 
for changes in terms and maturities (Frank Nothaft and James Freund, 
“The Evolution of Securitization in Multifamily Mortgage Markets and Its 
Effect on Lending Rates,” Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 25, No. 2 
(2003), pp. 91-112.). We do not use the ACLI data in the current study 
since it is quarterly while the Cushman and Wakefield data are monthly. 
In addition to this, hotel loans are not necessarily made in each quarter 
by insurance companies. However, we do use the ACLI data to assess our 
combined data series (which we first convert to a quarterly series). Our 
overall data series for both office buildings and hotels is highly correlated 
with the data series from one source (ACLI). To account for possible LTV 
differences for the Cushman and Wakefield data we also estimate all VARs 
and all regressions with a control for LTV differences added to the models. 
The results (not reported for brevity) remain the same.
12 To account for the fact that our data use series from both Lehman and 
Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman, in addition to the results 
reported in the paper, we also estimate all VARs and all regressions in 
models that include a shift variable to account for change in the data. The 
results (not reported for brevity) remain the same.
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Informational Content of the Risk Premium and 
Delinquency Data
To examine the information contained in the pricing spread 
we first start by separately examining the relative risk premi-
um and relative delinquency data in univariate regressions. 
Efficient capital markets anticipate future developments 
and adjust prices for risky assets when expected conditions 
change. In this environment, the risk premium differential 
may contain useful information for forecasting relative 
delinquencies.
We test this hypothesis using regression analysis. We 
first use delinquency as our dependent variable, and then 
we use relative risk premium as the dependent variable. The 
regression of the relative risk premium (RISKDIFF) on the 
past level of relative delinquencies (DELINQ) is estimated as 
follows:13 
The numbers in parentheses below coefficients are the 
t-statistic, with statistical significance marked by asterisks, as 
follows: *** = 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, and * = 
10-percent level. The regression coefficient for DELINQt, our 
variable of interest, is not significant, indicating that changes 
in delinquency do not seem to have explanatory power over 
changes in the risk premium. As a robustness check, we also 
estimate this regression with the lagged delinquency variable 
(that is, regressions with DELINQt-1 or DELINQt-2 as the 
independent variable). The results are similar, and so we do 
not report them for the sake of brevity.14
To test whether differential risk premium contains 
information on future relative delinquencies, we estimate the 
following regression, with the lagged relative risk premium 
(RISKDIFFt-2) as our variable of interest.
15 
13 Lagged values of the dependent and independent variables are in-
cluded to control for serial correlation in the data. We find that including 
the lagged dependent and independent variables in the regression results 
in residuals without autocorrelation (the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.05). 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to evaluate whether residuals 
in the regression have auto-correlation (that is, whether the residuals are 
correlated with their own past values). The values of DW statistic suffi-
ciently close to 2.0 indicate that the residuals do not have auto-correlation.
14 In addition, to account for the fact that our data uses series from both 
Lehman and Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman we also estimate 
the regressions reported in this section and all regressions reported in Ex-
hibit 6 in a model that includes a shift variable. The results (not reported 
for brevity) remain the same.
15 As with the prior regression, the other variables are included in the 
regression to control for serial correlation (the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is 1.7). The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to evaluate whether 
residuals in the regression have auto-correlation. The value of DW statis-
tic of 1.7 is sufficiently close to 2.0 and indicates that the residuals do not 
have auto-correlation.
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  (2.05)**   (22.70)***
  (1.52)   (-1.63)
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As above the numbers in parentheses below the coef-
ficients are the t-statistic, including indication of statistical 
significance. This result suggests that the relative risk pre-
mium is a predictor of the relative level of delinquencies, and 
we can conclude that the risk premium differential contains 
information for predicting relative delinquencies.
We perform one more robustness check including more 
lags, and estimate the following regression:
The Durbin-Watson statistic here is 1.99. The variable 
of interest is the lagged measure of the risk premium dif-
ferential (RISKDIFFt-2). The coefficient for this variable is 
positive (1.54) and significant (t-statistic of 2.79), confirm-
ing our results.
The results of the regressions are consistent with the 
presumption of efficient markets. Again, market prices an-
ticipate future deterioration in cash flows. In summary, the 
relative risk premium contains information on the future rel-
ative levels in delinquencies with respect to univariate tests.
Multivariate Analysis
Having established that the risk premium is a predictor 
of relative delinquencies in a univariate analysis, we now 
use multivariate analysis to explore the link between loan 
delinquencies, economic and financial conditions, and the 
risk premium differential. Here again we seek to determine 
whether the relative risk premium might contain useful 
information for forecasting delinquencies and foreclosures 
or whether, conversely, the delinquency rate might be useful 
in forecasting the risk premium. Since the variables we study 
are interrelated, we use the vector auto-regression approach 
(explained in Appendix B) to simultaneously examine our 
variables of interest as a system of equations. The main 
advantage of a VAR over ordinary regression is that a VAR 
takes into account mutual relationships in the inter-depen-
dent economic time series. The VAR system includes the 
following: the risk premium differential (RISKDIFF); a risk 
differential measured as the difference in standard devia-
tions between office REITs and Hotel REITs (DIFFSTDEV); 
the percentage change in the forward earnings per share, a 
measure of corporate profitability (PCTEPS); the unemploy-
ment rate (UNEMPL); and relative delinquencies (DELINQ). 
We include two time lags of each variable in this system, the 
previous month and the month before that.16 The growth 
rate in the expected earnings per share is included since it 
represents Wall Street’s consensus on the expected health 
of the economy and also reflects corporate management’s 
expectations. The unemployment variable is included since 
it captures the state of macroeconomy. Unemployment is 
also a demand indicator because it captures the level of 
economic activity as well as disposable income. The purpose 
of including DIFFSTDEV as a capital markets variable is 
that this measure of the difference in the standard deviations 
is our proxy for the additional riskiness arising from hotel 
performance over and above office properties. Appendix 
A provides further elaboration on the rationale for these 
variables.
We use impulse response functions to analyze the 
results of our VAR analysis, as shown in Exhibit 5. The top 
four graphs in Exhibit 5 show the response of the relative 
risk premium (as shown on the y-axis) to changes in the 
other variables in the system. In each case the response is 
traced forward for 12 months (x-axis). Each graph in the top 
row contains: (1) the zero effect level (horizontal black line); 
(2) the change in the risk premium differential to a unit 
change in the corresponding independent variable (shown 
as blue curve on the y-axis); and (3) the 95-percent confi-
dence interval (red dashed lines). If a risk premium response 
is within the error band from the zero effect for any graph, 
then this means that the response is not statistically differ-
ent from zero. If a response is separated from the zero effect 
level by a standard error band, this means that the response 
in the dependent variable to a shock in this independent 
variable is statistically different from zero. Starting with the 
16 We use our full sample of monthly data from July 1998 through March 
2011 to estimate the system. We also estimate the system with a term 
spread to account for the variation in the term structure of interest rates; 
the results (not reported for brevity) are unchanged from the results 
discussed in this section.
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Exhibit 5
impulse response functions for risk premium differential and 
relative delinquency rate
Response to Cholesky one S.D. innovations ± 2 S.E.
graphs at the top, the following results 
obtain:
• The relative risk premium increases 
with the relative riskiness of hotels, as 
shown by DIFFSTDEV (Graph 1.1);
• The relative risk premium increases 
given an unemployment shock 
(Graph 1.2);
• An increase in the expected earnings 
per share (EPS) lowers the relative 
risk premium, as shown by the nar-
rowed interest rate spread (Graph 
1.3); and
• Past delinquencies have no influence 
on the relative risk premium (Graph 
1.4).
The bottom four graphs of Exhibit 
5 depict the response of delinquencies 
in hotels relative to office buildings to 
changes in the other variables in the sys-
tem. Following are the key points, going 
from the graph 2.1 on the left to graph 2.4 
on the right: 
• Relative delinquencies increase given 
a shock in the relative risk premium. 
Thus, the risk premium differential 
remains an important predictor of 
the change in relative delinquencies 
when the effect of other financial and 
economic variables on delinquencies 
has already been taken into account 
in a system (Graph 2.1);
• An increase in the risk differential 
forecasts an increase in delinquencies. 
Thus, the riskiness of hotels relative to 
office buildings calculated using REIT 
returns (DIFFSTDEV) in the capital 
markets helps to predict future delin-
quencies (Graph 2.2);
• Relative delinquencies six months in 
the future will increase given a shock 
in the unemployment rate (Graph 
2.3); and
• An increase in expected EPS of the 
S&P 500 by Wall Street analysts 
forecasts a decrease in delinquencies 
(Graph 2.4).
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The multivariate time series regressions confirm 
our earlier result that the relative risk premium forecasts 
delinquencies in hotel loans relative to office loans. Exhibit 
6 reports the results of these multivariate regressions. Each 
column represents a different regression specification, as we 
discuss next. The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
level of delinquencies in hotels relative to office buildings, 
DELINQt. Lagged values of the dependent variable and of 
the independent variables are included in the regressions to 
control for serial correlation in the data.
The first column includes a specification comprising the 
following explanatory variables: the risk premium (lagged by 
four months), the difference in risk between hotel and office 
building REITs, and unemployment.17 Consistent with the 
VAR analysis, we find that the risk premium has a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient,18 indicating that an increase in 
the relative risk premium forecasts an increase in relative 
delinquencies. We also find that delinquencies are predicted 
to rise with either an increase in risk, as captured by the 
difference in risk between hotel and office building REITs, or 
worsening economic conditions, as captured by the unem-
ployment variable.19
The specification in the second column includes a 
longer lag of the risk premium (six months rather than 
four), and we use the percentage change in total employ-
ment instead of the static unemployment rate. The results of 
the second specification are consistent with the results from 
the first specification, and both are again consistent with the 
results from VAR analysis. In short, these analyses indicate 
that the differential risk premium for hotels is an important 
variable for forecasting delinquencies in hotel loans relative 
to office loans.20
Applications for Practitioners
This analysis shows that hotel interest rates contain forward-
looking information on loan performance when compared 
to office building interest rates. However, lenders don’t 
17 The lag structure for the explanatory variables is suggested by the 
results of the VAR analysis, after considering the significance levels in the 
impulse response functions.
18 The coefficient of 1.146, t-statistic of 2.01. 
19 We also estimate the same models as in the table, but with the term 
spread variable added to account for variation in the term structure of 
interest rates, and a shift variable added to account for the shift in the data 
from Lehman to Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman. The results 
(unreported for brevity) are unchanged from those reported.
20 To illustrate both the multivariate VAR model and the regression 
model, we plot model-implied delinquency rates and the actual (histori-
cal) rates in our data. The plot is presented in Exhibit 1. There are three 
curves on the plot. The first one (blue line) is the actual (historical) data. 
The second one (dashed red line) is the model-implied delinquency rate 
from the first regression model (the model in the first column of the table 
in Exhibit 6). The third curve (dashed green line) is the model-implied 
delinquency rate from the multivariate VAR model.
DELinQ(t) DELinQ(t)
Intercept -0.728
(-2.35)**
0.158 
(0.92)
DELINQ(t-1) 0.899
(10.49)***
0.892 
(9.98)***
DELINQ(t-2) -0.084
(-0.99)
0.010 
(0.12)
RiSKDiFF(-6) 1.146
(2.01)**
0.966 
(1.74)*
RISKDIFF(-7) -0.481
(-0.65)
-0.301 
(-0.41)
RISKDIFF(-8) -0.707
(-1.22)
-0.476
(-0.82)
DiFFSTDEv(-4) 0.075 
(1.68)*
DIFFSTDEV(-5) -0.088 
(-1.48)
DIFFSTDEV(-6) 0.127 
(2.75)***
DiFFSTDEv(-6) 0.138 
(2.98)***
DIFFSTDEV(-7) 0.007 
(0.11)
DIFFSTDEV(-8) -0.106 
(-2.28)**
unEMpL(-8) 0.707 
(1.94)**
UNEMPL(-9) -0.100 
(-0.19)
UNEMPL(-10) -0.423 
(-1.12)
EMpL(-9) -0.987 
(-1.89)**
EMPL(-10) -12.78 
(-0.23)
EMPL(-11) -0.275
(-0.44)
Durbin-Watson 1.89 1.89
Exhibit 6
Time series regressions of relative delinquency rate 
(DELinQ)
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appear to take into account past relative loan delinquencies 
in setting the risk premium and hence the interest rate for 
hotel deals. Knowing the future trend in loan delinquencies 
is important, since loan origination volume moves inversely 
with delinquencies, a situation depicted in Exhibit 7. When 
hotel delinquencies increase relative to office delinquencies, 
lenders are more willing to lend on office buildings than on 
hotels. 
In summary, based on our research, we can highlight 
several telltale signs that a rise in delinquencies is coming 
and thus a slowdown in mortgage originations on hotels 
will occur. Our “canary in a coal mine” factors, which can be 
found from the sources in the accompanying box, include:
• a widening of the interest rates on hotels relative to the 
interest rate on office buildings (a rise in the relative risk 
premium),
• a widening in the relative riskiness of hotels to office 
buildings calculated using REIT returns (σHotels - 
σOffice), and
• a decline in the expected earnings per share (EPS) for 
the S&P500, which is a proxy for an anticipated slow-
down in the economy, and 
• a rise in the unemployment rate. n
Exhibit 7
Relative delinquencies versus relative loan origination
 Note: This graph depicts the co-movement of the level of delinquencies in hotels relative to office buildings (DELINQ) and the origination volume index for hotels relative to 
office buildings.
“Canary” Factor Data Sources
Delinquencies by property Type: https://www.trepp.com/knowledge/
research/. Registration is required to see the free research portion of 
Trepp.
interest Rates by property Type: http://www2.cushwake.com/
sonngold/. (Cushman & Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman Capital 
Markets Report)
REiT Returns by property Type: http://www.reit.com/
DataAndResearch/IndexData/FNUS-Historical-Data/Monthly-Property-
Index-Data.aspx. To calculate the standard deviation, use the STDEV 
function in Excel for twelve months of returns.
Expected Earnings per Share: Expected EPS can be obtained either 
from Yardeni Research, Inc at http://www.yardeni.com/premium/login2.
aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fpremium%2fdefaultprem.aspx (Look under Quant 
Center → Briefings → Valuation Database) or the Bloomberg machine, 
or FactSet.
unemployment Rate: http://www.economy.com/freelunch/default.asp. 
The website is a part of Moody’s. Registration is free. Alternatively you 
can access the unemployment rate using http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/
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Appendix A:  
Relative Risk Premium and Other Data Series
The interest rate on hotels minus the interest rate on office buildings is 
equal to the relative risk premium. As shown below, the nominal interest 
rate has two components—the nominal risk-free rate and the default 
premium, where the default premium is the extra interest required over 
and above the risk-free rate to compensate the lender for the probability 
of default:
Interest rateHotel = Riskfree rate + Default premiumHotel
Interest rateOffice = Riskfree rate + Default premiumOffice
Relative Risk Premium = Interest RateHotel – Interest RateOffice
                   = Default PremiumHotel – Default PremiumOffice
We use the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond as the risk-free rate.
Example
According to the Cushman & Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman Capital 
Markets Report dated July 15, 2013, the yield on the 10-year Treasury 
bond (T) is 2.68%, the default premium on Class A Office is 230 basis 
points (2.3%), and the default premium on a Full Service, Class A hotel 
is 295 basis points (2.95%).1 Therefore
Interest RateHotel = T + 295bps = 2.68% + 2.95%  
Interest RateOffice = T + 230bps = 2.68% + 2.30%
Relative Risk Premium = Interest RateHotel – Interest RateOffice  
  = 2.95% - 2.3% = .65%
In this example, then, the lender requires an additional .65% to make a 
hotel loan over a loan on an office property.
For the risk premium we use data from two sources, Lehman Brothers 
prior to January 2008 and Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman 
thereafter. Wall Street analysts use spread at the time of loan origination 
(SATO) as a measure of default risk. The reason for using SATO as a 
default metric is that the yield spreads (interest rate – risk free rate) for 
various property types include two options, default risk (put option) and 
prepayment risk (call option). Prepayment risk for commercial mortgages 
is minimized through “lock out” provisions or “yield maintenance” 
requirements, which reduce the value of the call option while the value 
of the put option (default) remains unchanged.
We subtract the SATO corresponding to office loans from the SATO for 
hotels to obtain the risk premium differential at time t (SATOHotel,t – 
SATOOffice,t). Our variable of interest is the risk premium differential 
(incremental risk premium for hotels over and above office properties), 
as shown in the shaded yellow band in Exhibit 2 and solid line in Exhibit 
1 Cushman & Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman, “Capital Markets Report,”  
http://www2.cushwake.com/sonngold/(as viewed on July 15, 2013).
3. A positive risk premium differential suggests higher risk including 
greater default (delinquency) risk since the hotel loan is made at a wider 
spread.
The real estate variable of interest is the incremental delinquency rate for 
hotels relative to office properties (DELINQ). The incremental delinquency 
rate is a useful indicator of the volume of distress that hotel loans are 
experiencing relative to office buildings. As we indicated in the source 
box, these data are published by TREPP, the commercial mortgage 
analytics firm, in their monthly “CMBS Delinquency Report.” The 
macroeconomic variables we examine include the percentage change or 
growth rate in expected corporate earnings per share on the S&P500 
(PCTEPS), the growth rate in total employment (EMPL) expressed as a 
decimal, and the unemployment rate (UNEMPL).2 The growth rate in the 
expected earnings per share is included since this represents Wall Street’s 
consensus on the expected health of the economy and also reflects 
corporate management’s short-term expectations.3 Since most overnight 
stays are business-related and corporations plan their travel in advance, 
expected earnings are used as an anticipated demand instrument.4 
Expected earnings should also reflect future disposable income growth, 
because the leisure market segment depends heavily on disposable 
income. Finally, news about future corporate earnings could also reflect 
corporate borrowers’ shocks to their future ability to pay debt. Our 
rationale for including expectation variables is that if markets are 
efficient then credit spreads should reflect expectations in addition to 
realizations. As a capital market variable, we use the difference in the 
standard deviation of total returns on hotel REITs and office REITs 
(DIFFSTDEV). This is our proxy for the additional riskiness in performance 
of hotel REITs compared to office REITs as anticipated by stock market 
participants over a twelve-month period. We use volatility of REIT returns 
as a metric of the uncertainty about future returns on a property type. 
Other authors have used the implied volatilities of near-the-money 
options on the OEX(S&P100) index to proxy for changes in a firm’s future 
volatility in their study of credit spreads,5 and corporate bond studies 
2 Research indicates a connection between real estate returns and the mac-
roeconomy. See: Nafeesa Yunus, “Modeling Relationships among Securitized 
Property Markets, Stock Markets, and Macroeconomic Variables,” Journal 
of Real Estate Research, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2012), pp. 127–156. We focus on 
the role of macroeconomic conditions in setting relative cost of capital. In 
equilibrium there is a direct link between cost of capital and returns.
3 Analysts typically form their expectations of earnings per share after con-
ference calls with a firm’s management.
4 Wheaton and Rossoff use GDP as their primary demand instrument. See: 
William Wheaton and Lawrence Rossoff, “The Cyclic Behavior of the U.S. 
Lodging Industry,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1998), pp. 67–82). 
We do not use GDP our study since it is not forward looking. Besides this, 
GDP is published quarterly and revised monthly.
5 The other authors use noncallable, nonputable debt of industrial firms in 
contrast to our study, where mortgages contain both a call and a put option. 
For example, see: Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Robert Goldstein, and Spencer Mar-
tin, “Determinants of Credit Spread Changes,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, 
No. 6 (2001), pp. 2177–2208. Further, studies have found that systematic 
volatility is not priced in the cross-section of equity REIT returns, but idiosyn-
cratic volatility is priced, as discussed in: Jared DeLisle, McKay Price, and C.F. 
Sirmans, “Pricing of Volatility Risk in REITs,” Journal of Real Estate Research, 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (2013), pp. 223–248. This finding warrants our investigation 
of the role of standard deviation.
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have often used stock returns to proxy for changes in a firm’s health.. 
Titman and Torous indirectly show that greater variability of property 
values increases the likelihood of default in circumstances where the 
unpaid loan amount exceeds property value.6 REIT returns are used, 
given the greater frequency of monthly values relative to underlying 
property values, which are typically reported on a quarterly basis. In 
addition to this, REIT returns contain market expectations for a given 
property type in contrast to underlying property values. Other factors 
being equal, the volatility of hotel REITs should exceed office REIT 
volatility given the higher frequency of rent resetting for the hotel REITs 
due to their shorter lease term. Hotel property values should thus adjust 
more quickly relative to office values which are subject to existing 
contract rents on longer term leases.
6 Sheridan Titman and Walter Torous, “Valuing Commercial Mortgages: An 
Empirical Investigation of the Contingent- Claims Approach to Pricing Risky 
Debt,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1989), pp. 345–373.
Appendix B: Vector Autoregressiosn (VAR)
A vector autoregressive system (VAR) is a system of simultaneous 
equations, similar to those found in algebra, when a set of equations has 
more than one unknown and the solution to finding the unknowns 
involves manipulating the entire system of equations. In the VAR system, 
all variables depend on all the other ones, are endogenous, and can 
have a relationship with all other variables in the system. 
In a system with two equations, you might have the following:
6X + 4Y = 4
6X – 2Y = 16.
Our two unknown variables could be X = Occupancy and Y = Average 
Daily Rate (ADR). The product of these two variables, of course, is 
Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR), and all three of these variables 
are related. One can achieve identical RevPAR by having a high 
occupancy and a low ADR or a low occupancy and a high ADR. 
Occupancy depends on ADR and ADR depends on occupancy in much 
the same way that the interest rate and the loan amount are related. The 
interest rate charged depends on the loan amount borrowed and the 
loan amount borrowed depends on the interest rate. In this study we 
employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model to simultaneously analyze 
the information content of the risk premium differential for hotels and 
the information contained in our macroeconomic variables measuring 
activity in the economy as a whole, the capital markets, and the real 
estate markets. Using a VAR model is appropriate since our variables are 
interdependent with one another. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) has 
used a VAR process to do hotel forecasts for various European cities. For 
example, PwC made the following comment:7
The econometric models used were similar to the PwC UK Hotels 
Forecasts models, based on a Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
framework. Each city has an independently-estimated VAR model. 
This type of model was chosen because it allows for interaction 
between occupancy and average room rates, as we observe in the 
market. Each VAR uses occupancy rate growth and real ADR growth 
as dependent variables, while the explanatory variables include lags 
of the dependent variables and a set of macroeconomic explanatory 
variables.
7 PwC, “Best placed to grow: European cities hotel forecast, 2011 & 2012,” 
p. 44.
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The variables used in the PWC model are as follows: 
Dependent Variables: Occupancy (%), Average Daily Rate (ADR)
Explanatory Variables: GDP, Exchange rates (X), Unemployment (U), 
 Investment (I), Consumer expenditure (C),  
 Domestic interest rate (R), and Hotel room supply (S)
To examine the joint evolution of the preceding two dependent 
variables—Occupancy and ADR—the following VAR system consisting of 
two regression equations, one for each variable is simultaneously 
estimated.
OCCt = α1 + β1,1OCCt-1 + β1,2OCCt-2 + β1,3ADRt-1 + β1,4ADRt-2 
+ β1,5GDPt + β1,6Xt + β1,7Ut + β1,8It + β1,9Ct + β1,10Rt + β1,11St
ADRt = α2 + β2,1OCCt-1 + β2,2OCCt-2 + β2,3ADRt-1 + β2,4ADRt-2 + 
β2,5GDPt + β2,6Xt + β2,7Ut + β2,8It + β2,9Ct + β2,10Rt + β2,11St
In each regression equation, past (lagged) values of the dependent 
variable are included. For example, in the first equation above, the values 
of the past Occupancy (OCC) variable are included: with one lag, OCCt-1 
and with two lags, OCCt-2. Thus, the system is said to be estimated with 
two lags. Each regression equation also includes the past (lagged) values 
of the other two variables in the system. When the equations are 
estimated simultaneously, the estimates of the coefficients αi and βi,j are 
obtained. To give the reader a better sense of the subscripts t, t-1, and 
t-2 relative to occupancy and ADR, we provide the following example. 
The data for this example, shown above in Exhibit B1, come from STR for 
the U.S. luxury market.
If we let time (t) equal December 2010 (i.e., t = 2010.12), then the 
occupancy is 56.55 percent and ADR is $276.52 at time t. In November 
(t-1) occupancy is 64.55 percent and ADR is $249.72. In October (t-2) 
occupancy is 72.35 percent and ADR is $256.21. Exhibit B1 shows this 
occupancy series (t) at one lag (t-1) and two lags (t-2). A similar situation 
holds for the ADR series lagged using one lag and two lags.
The VAR technique is useful in examining complex relationships among 
variables when the variables are serially correlated—that is, past values 
tend to persist (for example, if occupancy or ADR is high in the prior 
periods it is also high in the current period). Typically, VARs have little 
serial correlation in the residuals. This is helpful for separating out the 
effects of economically unrelated influences in the VAR. We use the VAR 
to reveal the evolution of the credit spread and the other economic 
variables as well as the dynamic interactions between the variables.
The VARs are analyzed by examining impulse response functions (IRFs), 
which graphs how a given variable in the VAR system responds over time 
to a change (a shock) in every other variable in the system. A VAR 
provides a way of letting the data determine the dynamic structure of a 
model. Thus, after estimating a VAR, an impulse response function 
characterizes its dynamic structure. The impulse responses do this by 
showing how shocks to any one variable filter through the model to 
affect every other variable, and eventually feed back to the original 
variable itself.
Exhibit 1b
occupancy and average daily rate for u.S. luxury chains
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